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There have been many tests of the descriptive validity of the axioms of expected 
utility theory (EU) using money outcomes. Such tests are relatively uncommon with 
respect to health outcomes. This is unfortunate, because the standard gamble - 
considered by many health economists to be the gold standard for cardinal health state 
value assessment - is implied from the axioms of EU. In this paper, the classic Allais 
paradox, which predicts a systematic violation of the independence axiom, is tested in 
the context of health outcomes. Seventeen of 38 participants demonstrated strict 
violations of independence, with 14 of these violating in the direction predicted by 
Allais. The violations were thus significant and systematic. Moreover, the 
participants’ qualitative explanations for their behaviour show seemingly rational and 
not inconsistent reasoning for the violations. This evidence offers a further challenge 
to the descriptive validity of EU, and underlines the need to test alternative theories of 
risk and uncertainty in the context of health outcomes.    
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  11. Introduction 
 
Cardinal health state value assessment is undertaken with a variety of techniques. The 
most common instruments are the standard gamble, the time trade-off and the visual 
analogue scale. Health care decisions invariably involve risk. The time trade-off and 
the visual analogue scale do not internalise attitudes toward risk. If we assume that 
risk attitude is a relevant component of the individual’s utility function, these 
instruments therefore lack validity in eliciting health state values in contexts where 
outcomes are uncertain. The standard gamble, however, is implied from the axioms of 
expected utility theory (EU), and thus has a firm basis in the theory of risk and 
uncertainty. It is for this reason that the standard gamble has been reported to be the 
gold standard in the measurement of cardinal health state values (Torrance, 1986), 
though, admittedly, some challenge this view (Wakker & Stiggelbout, 1995).  
 
The foundations of EU were laid in the 1940s (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). 
However, since the 1950s, the descriptive validity of EU has been increasingly 
discredited through the empirical testing of its axioms (for a review, see Camerer, 
1995). Most of this empirical testing has been undertaken in the context of money 
outcomes. There have been few direct attempts at testing the descriptive validity of 
EU in the context of health care (Wakker & Stiggelbout, 1995), though there is some 
evidence to suggest that the independence axiom is compromised in risky health-
related scenarios (e.g., Bleichrodt & Johannesson, 1996; Llewellyn-Thomas, 
Sutherland, Tibshirani, Ciampi, Till & Boyd, 1982; Rutten-van Molken, Bakker, van 
Doorslaer & van der Linden, 1995; Spencer, 1998). Indeed, it is the independence 
axiom that has generally been subject to most of the criticism of EU.  
 
Independence implies that the intrinsic value that an individual places on any 
particular outcome in a gamble will not be influenced by the other possible outcomes 
(either within that gamble or within other gambles to which the gamble is being 
compared), or by the size of the probability of the outcome occurring. The axiom 
requires that, when comparing gambles, all common outcomes that have the same 
probability of occurring will be viewed by the individual as irrelevant. This 
requirement can be demonstrated with the aid of Table 1.    
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
In Table 1, gambles A, B, A' and B' are presented in a collapsed format. It can be seen 
from Table 1 that, with a probability 0.89, A and B share a common outcome of 
$1million and A' and B' share a common outcome of $0. In all other respects A is 
identical to A' and B is identical to B'. Consider the case where an individual is asked 
to choose between both A and B, and A' and B'. Assuming independence, the 
individual’s preferences should be unaffected by changes in the common outcome 
between choice contexts. Therefore an individual who prefers A (B) in the choice 
between A and B should prefer A' (B') in the choice between A' and B'. 
 
In a famous criticism of EU, Maurice Allais argued that under certain conditions 
individuals will systematically violate independence (Allais, 1953). In a non-
collapsed format, A, B, A' and B' in Table 1 can be presented as: 
 
A:  10% chance of $5m, 89% chance of $1m, and 1% chance of nothing 
  2B:   $1m for certain 
A':  10% chance of $5m and 90% chance of nothing 
B':  11% chance of $1m and 89% chance of nothing   
 
Allais argued that when individuals are faced with choices between A & B and A' & 
B' in the non-collapsed format, many individuals will display a preference for B and 
A', which violates the independence axiom. Allais’ proposition is known as the Allais 
paradox (or the common consequence effect), and has been empirically supported in 
subsequent analyses (Camerer, 1989; Conlisk, 1989; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
MacCrimmon & Larsson, 1979; Morrison, 1967; Moskowitz, 1974; Slovic & 
Tversky, 1974).  
 
An explanation for the Allais paradox is the certainty effect, where it is suggested that 
some people will overweight outcomes that are considered certain relative to those 
that are merely probable (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). There are several, possibly 
interdependent, explanations for the certainty effect. For example, the effect may be 
associated with the commonly observed propensity for people to demonstrate loss 
aversion (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Loss aversion is the psychological 
process that induces people to perceive losses to loom larger than gains. That is, the 
disutility that individuals seemingly suffer from losses is of significantly greater 
magnitude than the utility they enjoy from gains of the same absolute size (e.g. the 
disutility of losing $50 is of significantly greater magnitude than the utility of winning 
$50).  
 
In terms of the Allais-type introduced by Allais, loss aversion may be particularly 
strong in the choice between A and B. This is because individuals have the 
opportunity to avoid completely the possibility of winning nothing in this choice. 
Since B offers $1m for certain, the $1m may serve as a ‘reference point’, and thus 
winning nothing may be perceived as a loss that people will be particularly keen to 
avoid. However, in the choice between A' and B', both gambles offer a high 
probability of winning nothing. The individual’s reference point may have therefore 
fallen, perhaps almost as low as $0, and thus the extent to which winning nothing is 
perceived as a loss may have significantly diminished. Compared to the choice 
between A and B, this cognitive process would weaken the influence of loss aversion 
on decision making behaviour and prompt many individuals to base their decision on 
the size of the best possible outcome rather than the avoidance of the worst possible 
outcome. Hence, the commonly observed preferences for B and A'. 
 
A second possible psychological process that may underlie the certainty effect is 
anticipated regret (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; 1987a; b). For example, 
people may expect their regret to be greater should they realise a poor outcome in a 
choice context where the poor outcome could have been entirely avoided than in a 
choice context where there is always some chance that the poor outcome will occur. A  
complementary theory of disappointment has also been formulated (Loomes & 
Sugden, 1986). Whereas anticipated regret modifies the values that people place on 
outcomes in accordance with the likely corresponding outcomes across different 
gambles, anticipated disappointment modifies the value that people place on the 
gamble in relation to the potential outcomes contained within that same gamble. For 
example, people know they will be successful if they choose B; their expected utility 
of B will be the utility they derive from $1m. In A their chances are also excellent; 
  3should they choose this gamble and win nothing they anticipate their disappointment 
to be severe. This anticipated disappointment may therefore significantly decrease 
their expected utility of A. However, in the choice between A' and B', they may expect 
to win nothing whatever they choose, and will therefore feel relatively little 
disappointment if they should win nothing. Since the chances of winning in A' and B' 
are similar, they may simply opt for the option with the highest potential outcome.  
 
A cognitive process that applies to the probabilities rather than the outcomes has also 
been put forward as an explanation of the common consequence effect, and relates to 
evidence that individuals tend to transform probabilities so as to overweight small 
probabilities and underweight large probabilities (e.g., Bleichrodt & Pinto, 2000; 
Bleichrodt, van Rijn & Johannesson, 1999; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Lattimore, Baker 
& Witte, 1992; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Wu & Gonzalez, 
1996; 1999). The significance of probability transformation as a possible explanation 
for the Allais paradox is that people may perceive the difference between the 0% and 
1% chance of winning nothing in B compared to A as greater than that between the 
89% and 90% chance of winning nothing in B' and A'. Thus, we have a further 
possible psychological reason for why people may systematically prefer B and A'.       
 
The objective of this paper is to quantitatively and qualitatively assess compliance 
with the independence axiom in Allais-type health contexts. Qualitative evidence is 
gathered in an attempt to better understand the reasoning behind people’s preference 
patterns, and, if violations of independence occur, whether their reasoning conforms 
with the main hypotheses that have been put forward to explain the Allais paradox. 
Other important features of the analysis are that it represents a rare attempt at directly 
testing the descriptive performance of EU in the context of health outcomes, and that 
the common outcomes in the Allais contexts are presented to the participants in an 
explicit, collapsed format. This gives added weight to the claim that any evidence of 
the Allais paradox is accounted for by a deliberate failure of independence rather than 








The participants were recruited in June 1999 from the staff of a large health care-
related organisation situated in London. No payment was offered to the participants in 
this study.   
 
Thirty-eight people agreed to participate. To obtain agreement to undertake the study, 
the author had to guarantee that the participants would remain strictly anonymous. 
Therefore, very little information on the construct of the participant population can be 
given. It can be stated that participants were recruited from all grades within the 
organisation - i.e. from the general office staff to the directors - and that 55% (21/38) 
were women. The participants partook in the study in nine groups of between two and 
six people during July and August 1999. 
 
 
  42.2. Design 
 
The results reported in this paper area nested part of a larger study in which each 
participant was presented with 20 health care contexts. In order to gain and maintain 
the full understanding and interest of the participants, the study was designed with the 
aim of presenting the contexts with as much clarity as possible. With this in mind, the 
options in each context were presented in pie chart format where the outcomes and 
associated percentage chances of occurring were explicitly stated. The two Allais-type 
contexts used in this study are presented in Figures 1 and 2.  
 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2] 
 
As detailed in Figures 1 and 2, the participants were asked to imagine that they have 
an illness from which, without treatment, they would die almost immediately, and that 
their doctor tells them that there are two alternative treatments for their illness. The 
construction of the two pies in each context illustrates the chances of particular 
outcomes from the two available treatments. Note that in order to make things as 
simple as possible for the participants, outcomes are framed in terms of healthy life 
expectancy rather than more complicated outcome measures, such as multi-
dimensional health state descriptions. 
  
Each participant was asked to rate the treatments (a) and (b) on a scale, which had the 
outcome of an unavailable treatment - 30 years in full health followed by death - at 
the top of the scale, and the outcome of no treatment - immediate death - at the bottom 
of the scale. Indifference could be indicated by rating both treatment options at the 
same point on the scale. It was emphasised that this was an ordinal rating; the 
participants were informed that the differences between their ratings of treatment 
options would not be taken as an indication of the strength of their preferences. No 
effort was made to measure cardinality in this study. The participants were informed 
that there are no right or wrong answers to any of the contexts, and the order in which 
the contexts were presented was randomised across participants.  
 
The reason why the participants were asked to rate the alternatives in each context on 
a scale rather than to directly choose between treatments (a) and (b) was because the 
larger questionnaire in which the Allais-type contexts were nested contained many 
contexts in which the two treatment alternatives shared a common outcome. If the 
participants had been asked to choose directly between treatment options, they may 
have soon learned that many contexts contain options with a common outcome. This 
could have led them to search for and cancel any common outcomes before evaluating 
the available options with the appropriate level of care and consideration. Such an 
occurrence would represent an immediate focus on a particular outcome and could 
give rise to a cognitive process that would hardly, if ever, be induced in real world 
settings. It was thus considered important to reduce the possibility of an unnatural and 
immediate focus upon any particular outcome. It was thought that by asking the 
participants to rank each treatment on a scale that was marked with the endpoints of 
living for 30 years and immediate death (i.e. endpoints that did not share the common 
outcomes in the treatment options), they would be more likely to consider all 
outcomes in each treatment option before indicating a preference.   
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the common outcome of an 89% chance of living for 12 years in full health then 
death, and treatments (a') and (b') in Figure 2 share the common outcome of an 89% 
chance of immediate death. It is easy to observe that if the respective common 
outcomes are disregarded, the two contexts are identical. According to the 
independence axiom, individuals should rate (a') higher than (b') if they rate (a) higher 
than (b), or (b') higher than (a') if (b) higher than (a) (or they should express 
indifference in both contexts). Preference patterns (a) then (b') or (b) then (a') 
represent strict violations of independence. To test whether any observed violations of 
independence are systematically in the direction of that predicted by Allais - i.e. (b) 
then (a') - the chi-squared (χ
2) statistic, denoted χ
2
n(m) where n is the level of 
significance and m in the number of degrees of freedom, is used.  
 
In order to familiarise the participants with the general format of the contexts, and in 
anticipation that some participants might find treatment options that include two 
different percentage chances of the same outcome strange (as in option (b) in Figure 
1), all participants were given three practice contexts before they answered the full 
questionnaire. One of the practice contexts was identical to Figure 2, which also 
appeared in the full questionnaire. In order to ensure that participants fully understood 
the contexts placed before them, they were allowed to ask questions during the 
practice session. All participants were informed that though the presentation of some 
options may appear strange, they should answer as best they can according to their 
own individual preferences. All participants stated that they understood and were 
happy with the presentation of the contexts before they began the full questionnaire, 
which they were required to answer without conferring and without asking any 
questions. Whilst answering the full questionnaire, the participants were free to return 
to previous contexts in order to revise their answers.  
 
After each context, the participants were asked to write down briefly in their own 
words the reason for their rating of the two treatment options. This was undertaken to 
attain qualitative evidence concerning the cognitive processes underlying the 










In presenting the results, it is necessary to refer to contexts 1 and 2 in Figure 1. Table 
2 shows the preference patterns observed after participants had rated treatment (a) 
against (b), and (a') against (b'). 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
In Table 2, preference pattern (a) (a') refers to a situation where treatment (a) is rated 
higher than (b) in context 1 of Figure 1, and (a') is rated higher than (b') in context 2. 
All other preference patterns can be read similarly. The symbol (I) refers to a context 
  6where the participant is indifferent between the two treatment options. Of the 
observed preference patterns, (a) (a') and (b) (b') are consistent with the independence 
axiom. Preference patterns (a) (b') and (b) (a') represent strict violations of 
independence.  
 
Twenty of the 38 participants (52.6%) violated independence. This compares with 
violation rates of around 30-60% in studies that have incorporated money outcomes. 
Of the 18 participants whose preferences were consistent with independence, 14 
(77.8%) exhibited preference pattern (a) (a').  
 
It has been suggested that violations of independence are the result of errors.
32-34 If so, 
it is expected that the violations will be roughly equally split in both directions. That 
is, participants would be expected to exhibit patterns (a) (b') and (b) (a') in roughly 
equal numbers. In common with much evidence published in terms of money 
outcomes,
5-8,17-19 the results in Table 2 show that this is not the case. Fourteen of the 
17 participants (82.4%) who demonstrated strict violations of independence exhibited 
preference pattern (b) (a') (χ
2 = 7.12 > χ
2
.05(1) = 3.84), which accords with the Allais 
hypothesis.  
 
As mentioned earlier, partly as a test of consistency, one of the practice contexts given 
to the participants before they completed the main questionnaire was identical to 
context 2 in Figure 1. Twenty-six participants (68.4%) gave consistent answers for 





The qualitative results concerning only the two main preference patterns are noted 
here, which should be read with reference to Figure 1*.  
 
For participants demonstrating preference pattern (a) (a') (N = 14), there were two 
main patterns of explanations given for their preferences: 
 
(i)  Treatment (a) was preferred over (b) because the risk of the 1% chance of 
death is worth taking for the 10% chance of living for 18 years in full health, 
and (a') was preferred over (b') for the same reason (N = 4).  
 
(ii)  Treatment (a) was preferred over (b) because the risk of the 1% chance of 
death is worth taking for the 10% chance of living for 18 years in full health, 
and (a') was preferred over (b') because the difference between a 10% and an 
11% chance of a positive outcome is negligible, so one might as well choose 
the option that offers a chance of living for 18 years (N = 5). 
 
Both of these sets of explanations resulted in preferences that accord with the 
independence axiom. Participants who offered the first set of explanations gave 
identical, and thus perfectly consistent, explanations for preferring (a) and (a'). 
                                                 
* The participants who expressed preference patterns (a) (a') or (b) (a') but who are not reported to have 
followed one of the main patterns of explanations, failed to give a qualitative explanation for at least 
one of their answers. 
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processes for preferring (a) and (a'), both of which are perfectly acceptable ways of 
rationalising preferences, and reached conclusions that are consistent with EU.  
 
The sets of explanations given for the independence violating preference pattern (b) 
(a') (N = 14) were: 
 
(i)  Treatment (b) was preferred over (a) because the risk of the 1% chance of 
death is not worth taking for the 10% chance of living for 18 years in full 
health, and (a') was preferred over (b') because the difference between a 10% 
and an 11% chance of a positive outcome is negligible, so one might as well 
choose the option that offers a chance of living for 18 years (N = 2). 
 
(ii)  Treatment (b) was preferred over (a) because the certainty of a positive 
outcome is an overriding factor, and (a') was preferred over (b') because the 
risk of the 1% chance of death is worth taking for the 10% chance of living for 
18 years in full health (N = 2). 
 
(iii)  Treatment (b) was preferred over (a) because the certainty of a positive 
outcome is an overriding factor, and (a') was preferred over (b') because the 
difference between a 10% and an 11% chance of a positive outcome is 
negligible, so one might as well choose the option that offers a chance of 





The sample sizes in the qualitative results are very small but they do give some 
indication for the reasons behind people’s choices in the Allais contexts. Many of 
these reasons may have been easy to hypothesise, but it is necessary to obtain 
evidence in order to support hypotheses. For the three sets of qualitative explanations 
for the Allais paradox preference pattern (b) (a'), a different cognitive process is used 
to reach a preference for (b) than that used to reach a preference for (a'). It cannot be 
concluded that these cognitive processes are inconsistent. They are merely different.  
 
What appeared to happen is that when the participants were asked to rate an option 
that gives a positive outcome for certain against an option that has a small probability 
of immediate death, they often focused upon the small probability of immediate death, 
which may have induced risk averse behaviour. With an identical difference in the 
percentage chance of immediate death between the two options, but with a large 
chance of death in both options, the participants often appeared to attach less weight 
to the probability of death and were more likely to base their preference on the option 
that gave the best possible outcome, which resulted in seemingly risk seeking 
behaviour. These explanations are consistent with both loss aversion and the 
overweighting of small probabilities. By increasing the probability of death in both 
treatment options across contexts, and thus by omitting certainty (and negating the 
certainty effect), the prominent attribute in the contexts switched, for many 
participants, from probability to outcome, which appears to explain at least some of 
the violations of independence.  
 
  8Another important point to note is that in many of the money contexts that have been 
used to test for the Allais paradox, the options have been presented in a non-collapsed 
format, as explained earlier. In a non-collapsed format, it is not immediately obvious 
that the alternatives within a context share a common outcome, which may be used as 
an explanation as to why preference behaviour that is consistent with violations of 
independence has been observed. In the current study, the independence axiom was 
systematically violated even though the presentational design made it obvious that (a) 
and (b), and (a') and (b'), share a common outcome. Though it has been argued that 
the EU axioms would never be violated if they were presented in a clear and 
understandable manner,
32-34 many of the violations of independence reported in this 
paper appeared to be deliberate. These findings are consistent with those of Slovic and 
Tversky, who found that their participants generally did not change their preferences 
after hearing a counter-argument that conflicted with their initial choices in Allais-




Concerning the test of consistency, there are many possible reasons why only 68.4% 
of the participants gave the same answer to the practice context as they did to the 
identical context in the main part of the experiment. For example, many of the 
participants may have been almost indifferent between the treatment options in these 
contexts and thus prone to change their preference, their preferences may have be 
highly transient, or some of them could have made errors, particularly in the practice 
contexts which they undertook at the beginning of the experiment. There is a 
possibility that the practice context may have influenced the answers to the repeated 
context. However, a priori, it was considered important by the author that the 
participants expressed that they fully understood the Allais-type practice context 
before completing the main questionnaire, as it was feared that, if given cold, some 
participants would be confused by the Allais contexts in their collapsed format. In 
hindsight, a similar but not identical context to those used in the Allais paradox test 
may have been more appropriate to use as the practice context. 
 
As a further point relating to methodological design, it has recently been reported that 
pie charts are a poor format to use in both choice tasks, where participants are 
required to make simple larger/smaller judgements, and estimation tasks, where 
participants are required to make more precise evaluations.
35 Feldman-Stewart et al. 
found evidence to suggest that vertical bars, horizontal bars, numbers and systematic 
ovals are better than pie charts for choice tasks, and that numbers and systematic 
ovals are the best performers for estimation tasks.
35 The pie charts used in the 
experiment reported here were accompanied by numbers in terms of the percentage 
chance of surviving for x years, and thus it is assumed that the accuracy of the 
participants’ perceptions of the outcomes and associated probabilities was 
satisfactory. 
 
Given that descriptive violations of the EU axioms have often been reported, the 
modification of the standard gamble method to align with rank-dependent utility 
theory (RDU) has been suggested.
2 RDU generalises EU by weakening the 
independence axiom. An essential feature of RDU is that it assumes that people will 
apply decision weights to probabilities. For example, when people are faced with a 
treatment option that involves, say, a 1% chance of death, RDU specifies that they 
may apply a weight to the probability and perceive the chance of death as being 
  9greater than 1%. It is important to note that RDU significantly deviates from EU only 
for gambles or treatments that involve small or large probabilities of outcomes, but it 
can incorporate the main patterns of probability transformation reported in the 
literature.
10,28-31 If RDU reflects preferences better than EU, an argument can be made 
to transform the probabilities derived from the standard gamble method for the 
purpose of eliciting utility measurements.  
 
The axioms of RDU have been tested under risk and uncertainty in contexts using 
money outcomes, but the results have suggested that RDU may not offer a descriptive 
improvement on EU.
36-37 The theory has yet to be similarly tested in the context of 
health outcomes and, therefore, it is not known if an RDU-modified standard gamble 
method would be likely to improve approximations of health-related cardinal utility. It 
would thus be useful and interesting to test the underlying axioms of RDU and other 
generalisations of and alternatives to EU in the context of health outcomes. 
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  13Table 1 
Gambles demonstrating independence 
  Probability       
   0.89   0.10   0.01 
Gamble  A    $1m   $5m   $0 
Gamble  B    $1m   $1m   $1m 
Gamble  A'       $0   $5m   $0 
Gamble  B'    $0   $1m   $1m 
  14Table 2  
Quantitative results from the test of the Allais paradox 
Preference pattern  Number of participants 
(a) (a')
a,b    14   (36.8%) 
(b) (b')      4   (10.5%) 
(a) (b')       3   (  7.9%) 
(b) (a')
c    14   (36.8%) 
(a) (I')
d  2   (  5.3%) 
(I) (a')  1   (  2.6%) 
aPreference pattern (a) (a') implies a preference for treatment (a) over (b) and (a') over (b'). All other 
preference patterns can be read similarly. 
bPreference patterns (a) (a') and (b) (b') are independence conforming preference patterns. All others 
are independence violating preference patterns. 
c(b)(a') is the preference pattern predicted by the Allais paradox. 
d(I') implies indifference between (a') and (b'). (I) implies indifference between (a) and (b). 
  15Imagine that you have an illness from which, without treatment, you will die almost 
immediately. Your doctor tells you that there are two alternative available treatments for your 
illness. The two pies drawn below represent the chances of certain outcomes from the two 
treatments, treatment (a) and treatment (b): 
 
   (a)  (b) 
  
Your doctor tells you that a new treatment is being developed for your illness. This new 
treatment would give you thirty years of full health followed by death, but will not be 
available for you. Please rate treatment (a) and treatment (b) on the scale below. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The first context in the Allais-type test 
  16Imagine that you have an illness from which, without treatment, you will die almost 
immediately. Your doctor tells you that there are two alternative available treatments for your 
illness. The two pies drawn below represent the chances of certain outcomes from the two 
treatments, treatment (a) and treatment (b): 
 
   (a)  (b) 
 
Your doctor tells you that a new treatment is being developed for your illness. This new 
treatment would give you thirty years of full health followed by death, but will not be 
available for you. Please rate treatment (a) and treatment (b) on the scale below. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The second context in the Allais-type test 
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